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Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition. Alasdair Maclntyre. University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. 
Reviewed by Michael J . Quirk, Bellerose, New York 
The philosophical war between moral relativists and moral 
universalists has been going on for over two millennia, and it shows no sign 
of abating. The conceptual weapons used in this fight have changed over 
the years, but the battle lines remain stable: there are those who insist 
upon universal, necessary moral truths, present to human reason as such, 
from which an objective system of moral law can be deduced; and there 
are those who claim that moral truths, indeed all truths, are the .ultimately 
arbitrary expression of an individual's or a culture's non-rational 
preferences or desires. The course of the battle has by now become 
entirely predictable. The universalists will accuse the relativists of a 
preserved indifference to the manifest truths of reason and a tendency 
toward amorality, and the relativists will reply that all the universalists have 
succeeded in doing is begging the question, elevating their partisan 
prejudices into norms supposedly binding upon everyone. Each party to 
this dispute ends up by rejecting any common ground upon which it might 
be settled. The inevitable result: deadlock. 
Alasdair Maclntyre has been trying to break this deadlock for over a 
decade: his previous books After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? are equally hostile to both universalist absolutism and radical 
relativism. It is impossible to pigeonhole him into any prevailing political 
category. He explicitly rejects "modern systematic politics, whether 
liberal, conservative, radical, or socialist", on the grounds that no modern 
political ideology has made enough room for tradition-bearing 
communities, which alone can support morally worthy lives. More than 
any other english-speaking philosopher, he has stressed the 
indispensability of tradition in shaping both the form and the content of 
moral discourse and social practice, and has forcefully argued that the 
poverty of liberal individualism stems from its substitution of the market 
and the morally-neutral state for tradition-structured social and economic 
relationships. 
Yet his "traditionalism" is antithetical to that of conservatives such as 
Allen Bloom and William Bennett. For Maclntyre, it is misleading to 
depict traditions as storehouses of disinterested truths rather than as loci 
of intense intramural debate. Tradition is not a museum, as today's 
conservatives suppose, nor is it the dead weight of the past, as some 
liberals or radicals might judge, but rather the dynamic context in which 
all our words and deeds become meaningful. Thus tradition, properly 
understood, is the means whereby relativism is overcome without recourse 
to false necessities and fictional universal truths. By leading lives rooted in 
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traditions of rational enquiry, we can avoid the twin perils of modernity: 
the dogmatic arrogance that our own moral convictions are at bottom 
shared by every human being, and the rootless cynicism bred by the belief 
that all appeals to morality are groundless and self-serving. 
In Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, Maclntyre contends that 
most modern moral philosophy, especially since the Enlightenment, has 
exemplified dogmatic arrogance: it has been universalistic, or 
"encyclopedic", in its ambitions and presumptions. "Encylopedia", as an 
genre of enquiry, assumes that the fundamental truths of a discipline, 
whether mathematics, science, philosophy, or theology, are available to 
anyone and everyone at the onset of enquiry. These evident "first 
principles" are universal, timeless truths apprehended and validated by 
reason-as-such, quite distinct from the deliverances of tradition. Thus the 
ability to know that lying, stealing, or promise-breaking are wrong is 
present in each and every one of us, prior to all training and enculturation, 
and the justification of such moral precepts is independent of our ties to 
specific religious, moral, or political communities. 
Many modern moralists endorsed the encyclopedic conception of 
moral enquiry, and instead of converging upon a single set of first 
principles from which particular moral truths could be derived, they 
spawned many radically different sets of first principles and consequently 
many incommensurable moral theories. The proliferation of rival moral 
philosophies prompted Friedrich Nietzsche to wonder whether the whole 
philosophical enterprise, the search for "universal truths," was not a 
deceitful, ideological charade. Nietzsche "genealogized" moral 
philosophy: by chronicling what he took to be the resentful, manipulative 
psychology that gave rise to it, he portrayed "encyclopedic" knowledge and 
moral philosophy as the ploy of weak-yet-willful individuals, who hide their 
efforts at control and domination under the cloak of objectivity. 
Nietzsche's attack on moral philosophy eventually became an attack on 
objectivity itself: "truth", for Nietzsche, is the supreme fiction, a by-product 
of the arbitrary surgings of Will-to-Power. His more recent heirs, such as 
Foucault, extended and refined his genealogies. They claimed that to 
portray knowledge-claims as contingent episodes in human history is to 
unmask their pretense to objectivity and to show them for what they really 
are: manifestations of power and domination. 
From an encyclopedists' perspective, genealogists are mad, denying 
the very possibility of rational discourse. From a genealogist's perspective, 
encyclopedists are phonies and fools, blind to all the failed attempts at 
establishing universal systems of truths, yet doggedly affirming that their 
truth is the only truth. Is there any way out of this impasse? Maclntyre 
believes that there is. Alongside encyclopedia and genealogy, there exists 
an older, quite persistent form of tradition-centered moral enquiry, whose 
roots extend back to Plato, Aristotle, and St. Augustine, and which, in 
Maclntyre's view, received its fullest expression in the Summa Theologiae 
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of St. Thomas Aquinas. Against all forms of encyclopedia, traditionalists 
insist that the first principles of morality are not immediately present to all 
enquirers at the start of enquiry; one can arrive at an adequate 
understanding of morality only if one already holds certain beliefs and 
possesses certain character traits the moral and intellectual virtues. One's 
inquiry into the Good always presupposes a background of convictions and 
habits: the Enlightenment ideal of searching for the truth with a "clean 
slate", without reliance upon authorities or sages, divorced from the social 
and personal shaping of the self, is deeply mistaken. Against all forms of 
genealogy, traditionalists maintain that inquiry does advance toward more 
adequate formulations of objective truths: the genealogical rush to 
dismiss rationality as willful mystification is premature. 
Much of Three Rival Versions is devoted to an historical narrative of 
the way in which Thomas Aquinas synthesized the Greek metaphysics of 
Plato and Aristotle with the demands of Augustine's theology. When 
Aristotle's works were rediscovered in the 12th century and introduced into 
the curriculum at the university of Paris, where Thomas taught, the strains 
between the Judeo-Christian and Greek traditions became painfully 
evident. Yet Thomas saw through these differences to a hidden, 
underlying affinity, and used each tradition to remedy the defects of the 
other. The picture that emerges in Thomas's Summa Theologiae is the 
Aristotelian one of Human Beings as part of nature, able to know nature 
on its own terms, and able to extrapolate their knowledge of human nature 
into a moral system which guides us to virtue and thus happiness. Yet 
neither our knowledge of nature, nor our comprehension of our true end, is 
satisfactorily captured by a completely secular outlook: nature ineluctably 
points beyond itself to God as its author, and the quest for perfect 
happiness cannot be completed in this imperfect life. So in Thomas's 
Summa Augustine's theology complements and enhances Aristotle's 
metaphysics and ethics, just as it is itself complemented and enhanced by 
Aristotle's insights. 
Thomas's achievement, for Maclntyre, was to show that, unlike 
encyclopedia and genealogy, tradition-centered moral inquiry can 
progress toward more adequate approximations of the truth. Traditions 
generate their own internal conflicts, and square-off against rival 
traditions: but, as was the case with Thomas, the skilled adherent of a 
tradition can overcome these challenges by reformulating his or her own 
tradition, incorporating the advantages of its competitors, avoiding their 
incoherences and inadequacies, and showing how these failures are 
unavoidable on the rival's own terms of success. By contrast, 
encyclopedists cannot admit that reason was a (tradition-bound) history, 
and tend to lapse into despair when their search for universally-valid 
moral principles does not command universal agreement. And 
genealogists, who nurture this despair, and rejoice in reason's impotence, 
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cannot make minimal sense of their own convictions and their role in 
shaping their selves. 
Maclntyre's final chapter considers the fate of the modern university 
in light of his musings upon tradition, encyclopedia, and genealogy. 
Having detached itself from any substantive ties to particular religious 
communities, the modern university was from the start enthusiastically 
committed to the encyclopedic view of knowledge and inquiry. But as the 
fortunes of encyclopedia waned, so too did the university: the humanities 
and the social sciences could never find the grounds for universal 
consensus that the encyclopedic mode of inquiry promised, and they 
seemed more and more to be forums for sheer, arbitrary opinion. 
Although conservatives like Bloom and Bennett notice and deplore this 
fragmentation of the curriculum and rightly seek to transform it into 
something more coherent and rational, Maclntyre dismisses their "Great 
Books" approach as one more brand of ideological mystification. 
"Western Civilization" does not present us with one canon and one way of 
reading it: there are and always have been many rival lists of "Great 
Books" and many more systematic ways of interpreting them. Their 
presenting the curriculum as a conduit of "universal human values", or of 
"the legacy of the West", as if these notions were clear and uncontested, is 
yet another version of encyclopedia, expressly designed to forestall any 
radical questioning of the status quo. From Maclntyre's perspective, 
conservative academics may be justified in accusing many of their 
"politically correct" leftist colleagues of having abandoned rational inquiry 
for political grandstanding, but they themselves are doing precisely the 
same thing under the cloak of "scholarly objectivity". The only way the dire 
situation plaguing the university can be overcome is to admit that there 
are rival, incompatible traditions of thought, which necessarily view each 
other as not simply false but unintelligible, and to reconstrue education as 
an initiation into the radical conflict of these traditions. 
Maclntyre is a splendid narrative historian. His tales of such diverse 
figures as Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Foucault, and Nietzsche, not to 
mention Dante, Flaubert, and Paul DeMan, are far more illuminating 
than those told by most historians of philosophy, precisely because Three 
Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry is a history with a distinctive partisan point 
of view. Nevertheless there are notable gaps and shortcomings in this 
book. Maclntyre tends to equate "tradition" with the philosophy of 
Thomas Aquinas, more accurately, with his own, highly idiosyncratic 
construal of it. In doing so, he perhaps glosses over even more 
fundamental intellectual battles than those that rage between Thomism, 
Genealogy, and Encyclopedia. There are many Aristotelian traditionalists 
who would dispute Maclntyre's claim that Thomas's synthesis of Aristotle 
and Augustine is superior to Aristotle alone; parallel claims might be 
made by Augustinian purists. Present-day Jewish, Islamic, and Eastern 
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religious traditions are inappropriately left out of Maclntyre's picture 
altogether. 
Furthermore, Maclntyre is lamentably unclear about the ultimate 
role that authority plays in tradition. On the one hand, he portrays living 
traditions as capable of genuine progress, often involving substantial 
revision and reform. Yet in keeping with his conviction that philosophy 
demands the deference of "apprentices" toward the judgement of the wise, 
he insists that authorities need to ensure that radical dissent does not 
upset the integrity of the tradition. These aspects of Maclntyre's 
traditionalism seem difficult to reconcile. If traditions sometimes lapse 
into incoherence or sterility, as Maclntyre claims, it is reasonable to expect 
that they will demand internal critics who will challenge not only some 
basic precepts of the status quo but occasionally the authority of those who 
legitimate and insist upon them. So, despite Maclntyre's sizable 
achievement in this book and its predecessors, he has yet to offer his 
audience a convincing account of both the role and the limitations of 
authority in moral traditions. 
How Should 1 Live? Philosophical Conversations About Moral Life. 
Randolph M. Feezell and Curtis L. Hancock. New York: Paragon House, 
1991. Reviewed by William T. Mehl, University of Kansas. 
In their book, How Should I Live?, Randolph M. Feezell and Curtis L. 
Hancock present, as their subtitle explains, a set of philosophical 
conversations about moral life, and indeed, these dialogues about ethical 
theory cover most of the basic questions that people ask about living a 
moral life. Involved here are a lively, interesting group of characters on a 
university-sponsored backpacking expedition, who discuss ethics every 
night after the day's hike. 
The main participants are six men and four women. The men are a 
philosophy professor who leads the discussions, one of the guides who is a 
Recreation Studies student and Christian fundamentalist, a conservative 
businessman who has attended several summer philosophical 
conferences and is very interested in the work of Mortimer Adler, another 
younger businessman who is sympathetic to an ethics of self-interest and 
espouses Ayn Rand's philosophical views, a (black) government employee 
interested in politics, and a mysterious friend and former graduate school 
colleague of the professor who lives in the mountains and appears 
periodically to castigate philosophy in general and ethics in particular. 
The women are a Unitarian minister who is interested in environmental 
issues and feminism, a mother of four who is not particularly philosophical, 
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the other guide who is a student in Exercise Science and an athletic 
outdoorswoman, and a woman who works in the public school system and 
is pursuing a PhD in Educational Administration. 
In eight dialogues these people consider the nature of ethics, and 
ethics in relation to religion, relativism, self-interest, consequences, 
persons, virtues, and female voices. The primary characters are joined in 
the discussion on virtue by two Jesuit priests, appropriately fishing at the 
group's destination, Lost Lake. The discussion on female voices revolves 
around Carol Gilligan's work and occurs after the hiking expedition at the 
university's faculty club between the Unitarian minister and her friend, a 
female Women's Studies professor, and the philosophy professor and his 
friend, a male Political Science professor. A post-expedition party 
provides the scene for the epilogue where the question, 'Is Ethics 
Worthwhile?', is considered. 
Each conversation is followed by clarifying quotations on that particu-
lar topic from moral philosophy, a list of key terms and concepts to focus 
understanding of the topic, and discussion questions. These study aids 
provide the impetus for systematic thinking about the issues raised in the 
dialogues. 
There are several general and positive points I want to make about 
this book regarding its use as an introductory text. The thought-provoking 
introduction to the student contains several examples of problems 
requiring moral and nonmoral value judgments along with an ethics 
questionnaire concerning the nature of ethical thinking which can be used 
for initial discussion in order to ascertain students' presuppositions about 
morality and ethical theory. There is in-depth coverage of each topic 
especially, again, regarding the basic questions people ask about living a 
moral life. And, we see that real people are actually interested in living a 
good life and in thinking carefully about ethics. It becomes clear that an 
exploration of ethics is a rational effort, which includes many different, 
important perspectives, and many undeniably significant notions, all of 
which are part of making sense of our moral experience. We can see that 
ethical inquiry begins with wonder, that it can be conducted Socratically, 
and that reaching any sort of philosophical understanding is definitely a 
cooperative rather than an adversarial endeavor. Set in this positive 
framework, the authors present the basics for understanding ethics lucidly, 
in down-to-earth, non-technical language. This is an excellent explanatory 
groundwork for making sense of ethical theory, with enough open-
endedness to allow students to add their own views and concerns and thus 
to continue a fruitful philosophical dialogue. 
The discussion of virtue ethics and female voices is indeed laudatory. 
In the former there are critical considerations of Hume's fact/value 
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distinction and of the modern notion of the 'moral point of view', which, the 
Jesuit priests argue, is dependent on a notion of what the good is for 
human life, as transmitted in Western culture in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition. These points do indeed demand philosophical consideration. 
However, the profound importance of female voices in ethics is not, I 
think, made adequately clear. The very stating of the attitude of the male 
political science professor in this way—"I haven't taken the time to read 
Gilligan or any of the other feminists who have been doing work in political 
and moral theory. I wonder whether it's worth the effort. I'm not sure that 
feminism will be a sustainable intellectual project, at least in some of the 
more extreme forms it takes. It seem rather faddish." (191)—seems to legiti-
mate such attitudes and devalue the feminist project. Now, said professor 
is "perfectly open to persuasion" (192), and the conversation ends with his 
stating that he will actually "see what these feminists are talking about" 
(206), but I wonder whether the aura of disdain on his part is too strong. It 
is one thing if the first quote here is just a realistic reflection of an actual 
attitude on the part of some toward feminism, as it is no doubt intended as 
the professor exemplifies Gilligan's justice perspective by espousing a 
Hobbesian contractual view of ethics and politics, but quite another if 
setting this tone too much (perhaps unconsciously) devalues, and even 
nullifies, an attempt to understand a traditionally devalued ethical 
perspective. 
Further, the philosophy professor attempts to relate Gilligan's care 
perspective to the ethical tradition: "...the emphasis on context, on the 
particular nature of moral situations, has long been emphasized in the 
history of moral philosophy. Aristotle emphasizes that a judgment of 
practical reason...is highly contextual. ...I see Gilligan's emphasis on care 
and context as fitting quite nicely into the tradition of virtue ethics"; and, 
"any ethical theory that emphasizes the application of a very general 
principle to every specific situation would have to emphasize the particu-
larities of context. ...Act utilitarianism emphasizes the particularities of 
situations in just this way" (204). Now, this is correct of course; I especially 
agree that Gilligan's feminist perspective is more a virtue perspective than 
anything else, but Aristotle, and the ethical tradition, is certainly not 
interested in women's experience in relation to understanding anything, 
including morality and ethics. Ending the dialogue with this relating of 
Gilligan's work, as the feminist perspective, to the tradition of philo-
sophical ethics—which can be seen of course as cooptation of feminism by 
the patriarchal tradition because the view here seems to be that feminism 
just does not say anything of new importance—misses the point I think of 
listening to female voices in ethics. 
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The point is the problem of patriarchy in western civilization and this 
problem is not broached. Patriarchy is grounded in a patriarchal con-
ceptual scheme which holds the qualities traditionally identified as male 
as opposed to qualities traditionally identified as female—reason as 
opposed to feeling and justice as opposed to care are examples of such 
normative dualisms which are applicable here—to be the standards of 
value and the superior qualities; these male qualities ground men's power 
and domination in the world. There are of course people who have no 
power in the patriarchy, who are left out and oppressed on the grounds of 
sex, race, and class—there is also the domination of nature here—and such 
exclusion and oppression are legitimated by the many facets of patriarchy; 
and, traditional ethics, philosophical and religious, must be explored in 
order to ascertain how much it is a part of such legitimation.1 Feminist 
ethics, even though there is no general theoretical agreement among 
feminist philosophers about exactly what such an ethics is, does address 
the problem of rethinking traditional ethics in order to correct male bias 
and the exclusion and subordination of women.2 When the problem of 
patriarchy is made clear-and it needs to be made clear in relation to the 
consideration of any feminist criticism—I do not see how the feminist 
critique of philosophy in general and ethics in particular can be 
considered an unsustainable intellectual project, or how the problems it 
broaches can be seen as adequately addressed by the philosophical tradi-
tion. Indeed, if the moral perspective of women is not seriously 
considered, then we do not and cannot understand human moral 
experience, and thus we do not and cannot have an adequate 
understanding of ethics. 
Now, the dialogue concerning ethics and female voices can certainly 
be profitably used to initiate an exploration of the above notions; just so, I 
think, again, that this book covers, or will initiate, the basic questions that 
people ask about living a moral life. Indeed, Why Should I Be Moral?, is 
an assessable, intelligent, engaging, and stimulating text for introductory 
ethics courses. 
1 On the nature of patriarchy and the resultant exploitation, see for 
example: Karen J . Warren. "Feminism and Ecology: Making 
Connections." Environmental Ethics 9 (1987): 3-20. 
2 See: Alison Jaggar. "Feminist Ethics: Some Issues for the Nineties." 
Journal of Social Philosophy 20 (1989): 91-107. 
